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Explanations of foreign and particularly security policy behavior of any 
government usually include factors such as the relative position of a country 
within the international system and its perception of security threats. Triggered 
by the different reactions to 9/11 and its different perceptions of international 
threats such as terrorism and WMDs, Robert Kagan (2002) categorized US 
foreign policy behavior as paradigmatic for the only remaining superpower, and 
European behavior as paradigmatic for countries that had chosen to remain at the 
fringes of power politics because they simply did not have the capability or had 
learned their lesson from history. Kagan began his article with the now infamous 
distinction that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”. 
One could describe the development and current international role of Japan in 
a very similar way, an economic superpower but a “political pigmy” (2). Pygmy 
not in terms of its military arsenal and expenditure, but considering its real and 
potential political and military role in the postwar era.  Having experienced the 
catastrophic consequences of nationalism, militarism, and expansionism, after 
World War II the Japanese had completely changed their mindsets and embraced 
anti-militarism and the development towards a civil power (Berger, 1996; 
Berger, 1998; Hook, 1996). At least so it seems. This paper will analyze Japanese 
attitudes towards militarism. It will compare Japanese and US American 
attitudes in order to develop a better frame of reference for the interpretation of 
values and attitudes towards foreign policy issues and the relationship between 
societal and political systems in general.
* Assistant Professor at the Devision of the Social Sciences
Are Americans from Mars and
Japanese from Venus?
– New Approaches in Explaining Different 
Public Attitudes towards Foreign Policy 
in Japan and the United States(1) –
『社会科学ジャーナル』57 COE特別号〔2006〕
The Journal of Social Science 57 COE Special Edition [2006]
pp.305-330
Wilhelm Vosse *
306 307
Are Americans from Mars and 
Japanese from Venus?
I. Introduction
After the Meiji Restoration, the slogan of the Japanese government that also 
motivated the society at large was to “catch up with the West” by becoming a 
rich state with a strong army (fukoku kyôhei). In a breathtaking speed, Japan 
developed from a country that was technologically and politically comparable to 
Europe in the 15th or 16th century, to a country that was able to develop a military 
power that successfully fought a war first against China (1895) and then again 
Russia (1905). Soon thereafter, Japan occupied Korea (1910) and in the 1930s 
not only the Northeastern part of China (Manchuria) but large parts of East and 
south East Asia. The Japanese people had developed a feeling of superiority, 
ultra-nationalism, and militarism for which it would be hard to find a parallel 
in world history. Japanese economy and society was based on a militaristic 
ideology that was never seriously questioned and taken for granted by most until 
1945.
After losing the war, Japan was occupied and in 1947 given a Constitution 
that exemplified a high level of distrust by the US forces against the Japanese. 
The central objective after World War II was to de-militarize Japan by dissolving 
the Japanese Imperial Army and to make sure that Japan would never militarize 
again and endanger world peace. The core element of the de-militarization 
campaign was to put an article in the newly drafted Japanese Constitution that 
would ensure that Japan would never be able again to declare and fight wars 
against its neighbors. The two paragraphs of the Article Nine did not only 
include the universal “renunciation of war as a sovereign right of the nation” but 
also the renunciation of “land, sea, and air forces”. Because of Article Nine, the 
Japanese soon referred to it as the “Peace Constitution”, a title that is still widely 
used today. For most Japanese, the Constitution in general and Article Nine in 
particular became the core value of what  Japan should represent. After half a 
century of war and militarism, the Japanese took a 180-degree turn from the pre-
war slogan of “rich nation – strong army” to “friendly neighbor – small army”. 
The desire to become a civil trading nation gradually became a widely embraced 
ideal for most Japanese, who seemed to have turned from being militarist for 
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five decades into anti-militarists (Berger, 1998).
In the early postwar years, many Japanese wanted a complete shift from 
their militarist past, which had brought death, destruction, and the biggest 
single attack on civilians in world history, the dropping of two atomic bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For a large number of Japanese, the only solution 
could mean pacifism and a very strict adherence to Article Nine. This is the 
reason why Japanese went to the streets when Prime Minister Yoshida signed 
the US-Japan Security Treaty in September 1951. They realized that this would 
mean that Japan would eventually have an army again. In 1954, the Special 
Police Unit was renamed to Self Defense Forces (SDF), which, although legally 
not considered armed forces by the Japanese government, in reality performs all 
the duties and responsibilities and is equipped like an army.
Despite the existence of Japanese SDF and the AMPO Treaty, for most 
Japanese the core foreign policy ideal was the basically civil nature of Japan and 
the goal to solve international conflicts diplomatically, and not militarily. Despite 
being indirectly involved in the Korean and the Vietnam Wars, the Japanese 
people and the government could always argue that Article Nine prohibits them 
from being directly involved in any military campaign. Article Nine and the one-
sided US Security guarantees could be seen as an ideal combination that enabled 
the Japanese government to keep Japan out of harms way, provided Japanese 
security without the necessity to invest heavily in a military infrastructure, 
and finally maintaining the ideal (or image) of being a peaceful and non-
militarist state. For the Japanese themselves, it meant that they could easily 
portray themselves as a non-militarist country with only the best intentions 
without seriously reflecting on Japan’s prewar history as a militaristic and ultra-
nationalistic regional hegemon. Thomas Berger (1998) raised this paradox when 
he questioned the widely-held belief that Japan’s anti-militarism or pacifism is 
often explained by its suffering during World War II and particularly by being 
the only country that experienced the dropping of atomic bombs, when on 
the other hand Japanese are notorious for not considering their own actions in 
Southeast Asia between 1910 and 1945.
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The Japanese postwar defense policy has been relatively stable in that 
deterrence was taken care of by the United States since the 1951 US-Japan 
Security Treaty. However, even in the original 1951 treaty and then in the first 
revision in 1960, Japan was expected by the United States to gradually increase 
its own defense capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War and particularly 
after being criticized for not participating in the 1991 Gulf War militarily by 
the US and other Allied countries, the Japanese government extended the role 
of the SDF by enabling it to participate in UN Peace-Keeping Operstions 
(1992). More importantly, with the gradual acceptance of a larger responsibility 
for regional security from the Revised Defense Guidelines (1997), a series of 
defense related working papers by the Task Force on Foreign Relations for the 
Prime Minister (2002(3)) headed by Yukio Okamoto, to the National Defense 
Program Guidelines for 2005 (December 2004), they all intended to allow a 
larger international role of Japan. The latest step by the Koizumi administration 
was to send a small contingent of about 600 Ground SDF troops to Iraq in 2004. 
Just a few years earlier, this would have probably caused an outcry among the 
Japanese public, this time, however, Japan saw only a few demonstrations and 
protest movements, nothing to be too alarmed about. Compared to 1960, when 
the first revision of the AMPO Treaty triggered the largest and most violent 
demonstrations of Japan’s postwar history, sending SDF troops to Iraq seemed 
to have made most Japanese to “rally round the flag” or their government, an 
effect we also observe in the US or most other countries once a war begins or 
a country has “boots on the ground”. Between January 2004 and March 2004 
opposition against the deployment of SDF troops declined from 51% before 
to 43% after troops had been deployed. In March 2004, 51% were in favor of 
SDF deployment(4). This change seems to indicate that pacifism or better anti-
militarism might be conditional. This seems to be a paradigmatic development. 
The question that this article is going to deal with is whether Japanese are indeed 
different from people in other countries when it comes to support or opposition 
of military action, including those that might be sanctioned by the United 
Nations or the international community. Hence the question, whether Japanese 
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people, sixty years after the end of World War II and the enactment of Article 
Nine still maintain the anti-militarist ideals they are so well-known for.
For the Japanese case, the following hypothesis seem plausible:
1. Younger people are more likely to include militarist options into their 
views of the world and the role of Japan, because they have not directly 
experienced World War II, whereas older people who have either directly 
experienced the war or the hardship of the postwar years are more critical 
of military means and more pacifist. This finding would be relevant because 
it could indicate a growing acceptance of military means in the future.
2. Given the Postwar Japanese history, those on the political right have always 
been more inclined to change Article Nine and have taken the position that 
Japan should have an army(5). Therefore, it can be expected that people with 
right-wing political views are more likely to embrace militarism that those 
on the political left.
3. Given that younger age cohorts are expected to lean more towards militarist 
sentiment, it is nevertheless expected that their militarism is not based 
on nationalism or authoritarianism, but that they are still critical of many 
policies of the Japanese government. 
Defining militarism:
The militarism index used for analytical purposes in this article is derived 
from a combination of the following factors: A militarist is someone who 
considers war as justified when threatened by a hostile country (Q11d), when 
another country is harboring terrorist (Q11f (6)), someone who agrees that peace 
can be achieved through having strong defense capabilities (Q12f), someone 
who thinks that war is inevitable (Q13), and who thinks that defense spending 
should be increased (Q24).
Militarism or militarist attitude in the frame of this papers does therefore not 
mean that the respondent is a “war monger” or is inclined to solve international 
crises by military means, rather, it means “militarists” do consider military 
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options in case other means might fail. The definition of militarism used here 
includes the following five factors representing questions in the SAGE survey.
(1) War is justified when threatened by a hostile country.
A comparison between the US and Japan shows that in Japan, 14.9% 
consider this as “very justified” and 38.8% as “somewhat justified”. The 
respective figures for the US are: 51.1% and 35.7%.
(2) War is justified against a country that is harboring terrorists.
A comparison between the US and Japan shows that in Japan, 8.0% consider 
this as “very justified” and 31.5% as “somewhat justified”. The respective 
figures for the US are: 25.1% and 42.9%.
(3) “Strong defense capabilities” will result in peace.
A comparison between the US and Japan shows that in Japan, 3.8% “strongly 
agree” and 19% “somewhat agree” with this statement. The respective 
figures for the US are: 23.6% and 43.8%.
(4) War is inevitable and cannot be avoided through cooperation.
In Japan, 12.5% stated that wars are inevitable, in the US, 43.4%.
(5) Defense spending: On a scale between 1 (greatly decrease) and 7 (greatly 
increase), 9.5 % of Japanese chose (7) “greatly decrease” and the next 
category (6) combined, while the respective figure for the US is 18.2%.
As a combination of all of these five factors, I have constructed a militarism 
index, which is based on the following formula: 
Militarist Index: (RND((q11d/2)+(q11f/2)+(q12f/2)+q13+(8-q24)/4))-3(7))
II. Comparing Militarist Attitudes
When we compare militarist sentiment in Japan and the US, the difference 
could hardly be bigger. The following table 1 gives an overview of the 
distribution of the eight different categories this papers will use for analytical 
purposes. On a scale between 1 (Strong militarists) and 8 (Strong anti-
militarists), this paper categorized those between 1 and 3 as “militarists”, 4 and 5 
as mixed, and those between 6 and 8 as “anti-militarists”. A simple comparison 
between Japan and the US reveals a rather strong difference in all categories.
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While 50.8% of Americans can be labeled militarists, only 8.4% of Japanese 
fall under the same category (Figure 1). Given N=525 in Japan, the N for 
militarist Japanese is relatively small with only 44, whereas in the US the N=842 
and the absolute number of militarist in this study is 429. The following analysis 
will try comparing Japanese and American militarists in order to find out whether 
similar factors influence their actual and potential sentiment in both countries.
A direct comparison between levels of militarism in the United States and 
Japan reveal a very clear picture. Americans have significantly stronger militarist 
7.0
19.8
24.0
24.0
16.2
6.3
2.3
0.5
0.2
1.7
6.5
17.3
29.3
25.0
13.1
6.9
Table 1: Comparative Militarism Index 
USAJapan
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Strong Militarist
Strong Anti-Militarist
© 2005, Wilhelm Vosse.
Based on SAGE 2004. Figures given are percentage of respondents who are categorized 
between 1 “Strong militarists” and 8 “Strong anti-militarists”.
Figure 1
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attitudes than Japanese. Overall, Japanese are far more hesitant to use military 
means to achieve foreign policy objectives or in the case of a crisis. Hence, 
the gradual foreign policy changes in the last sixty years and particularly those 
of the last fifteen years have not had the effect of making Japanese embracing 
military options to a significant level. From a peace studies perspective this is 
a relief, however, the second question that has to be asked is what factors do 
influence militarist behavior in Japan, are they similar to the mechanisms that 
are at work in the United States, and is there any indications that the share of 
those with rather militarist attitudes will increase. It goes without saying that we 
cannot predict the future of militarist sentiment in Japan, this article is simply 
a first attempt to shed some light on the factors that seem to influence militarist 
attitudes in Japan in 2005. And a final note on the link between militarist 
attitudes and actual foreign policy. There is now broad theoretical and empirical 
evidence about a link between public opinion and foreign policy, here this link 
is not further explored and is left to further analysis (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, 
Sobel, 1993; Everts and Isernia, 2001; Holsti, 2004; Foyle, 1999; Sobel, 2001; 
Nacos et al., 2000; Powlick, 1995; Mueller, 2000; Holsti, 1992; Soroka, 2003; 
Isernia et al., 2002; Mueller, 1994; Kull and Ramsay, 2000).
III. Factors influencing militarist sentiment?
Simply comparing the overall level of militarist sentiment in both countries 
revealed something that is not surprising given the long history of anti-
militarist and often pacifist sentiment in postwar Japan. The difference can also 
be explained by extending Robert Kagan’s (2002) argument about Europe to 
Japan, namely that the attitudes of Japanese basically reflect the position of their 
country in world order today, and the way Japanese prefer the world to see them, 
namely as a peaceful nation with good intentions. Despite of a military budget 
that is in close range to those of other middle powers such as France, Germany, 
and the UK, Japan is portraying itself as a civil power, whose comprehensive 
security policy is based on trade and development assistance.  For Japanese 
this basically excludes any military options(8). In addition, the Japanese military 
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is hardly ever seen and reported about in the media and it was only after they 
were sent to Iraq in 2004 that the media reported from the Japanese camp in 
Samawah (Southern Iraq) and even interviews with soldier in uniform appeared 
on Japanese television. 
1. Data Analysis
The SAGE 2004 survey is a mail survey that was in the field in the 
USA and Japan in October and November 2004. The questions deal with six 
major areas: (1) justifications for wars and conditions for peace, (2) risk and 
threat perceptions, (3) political  and civil rights and the limitation thereof, (4) 
media usage, (5) trust in government and other organizations, and (6) levels 
of satisfaction with government foreign and immigration policies. Besides 
these attitudes, the survey also included questions about political orientations, 
international experience, political knowledge, materialism-postmaterialism, and 
social capital.
The following analysis is a first attempt in identifying factors that have a 
significant influence on militarist attitudes in Japan. Data from the US sample 
are used to put the Japanese findings in comparative perspective.  However, this 
is not a comparative paper in that it does not assume that the US is the ideal 
case for a comparison with Japan on issues of  attitudes on peace and security, 
so the disparate shares of militarists in Japan and the US are not surprising but 
are just evidence for the different historical experience and current position of 
both countries. On the other hand, this makes it all the more interesting, if there 
are still significant similarities in terms of what influences militarist attitudes. 
The following analysis will indeed show, that many factors that can be used to 
predict militarist attitudes in the US, can also be used in Japan.
The following table lists the factors that the following analysis will explore 
in more detail. The table lists the Pearson correlations of the most significant 
variables to explain our militarism index. The table lists the correlations first 
only for the US sample, then for Japan, and finally both samples combined.
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The analysis here is only the first attempt to explore a better explanatory 
model for militarist attitudes not only in these two, but eventually also for other 
industrialized countries. This table lists most of those variables that showed a 
significant correlation in both countries combined, but not all. Even some of the 
variables listed here show only a weak combined correlation but sometimes a 
stronger one in one of the two countries. The list is also divided in positive and 
negative correlations. This is only for better viewing of the table and does not 
indicate that the questions and the militarism index have a negative or positive 
correlation. This will be explored further in the respective headings.
2. Age and other Demographic Factors
As we can see in the list, age is a better predictor in Japan for militarist 
sentiment than in the US. With an r=:-222 this deserves a closer look. The 
following graph indicates a positive correlation with age. The two peak values in 
the two higher age cohorts can in part be explained by the small N in Japan.
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
(1)Militarism Index: RND ((q11d/2)+(q11f/2)+(q12f/2)+q13+((8-q24)/4))-3
.346**
.505**
.412**
.545**
.334**
.439**
.325**
.470**
.354**
.504**
.259**
-.259**
-.444**
-.79**  
.182**
.456**
.456**
.469**
.353**
.034    
.325**
.178**
.266**
.385**
.188**
-.284**
-.342**
-.222**
.353**
.527**
.367**
.390**
.306**
.241**
.100**
.536**
.328**
.414**
.418**
-.351**
-.507**
-.030    
Militarism Index(1)
Pearson Correlations
USA Japan Japan 
and US
Statement: Media support leader/raise tough questions
We should support leaders even if we don’t agree with 
their politics
Citizens should give up some freedom for better security
Schools should teach children to respect the national flag
Trust in government
Confidence in: Church or organized religion
Confidence in: Congress
Satisfied with foreign policy
Desirability of strong leadership
Confidence in: The military
How patriotic are you?
Feeling about Immigration
Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10
of left and right?
What is your age?
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q25
Q26a
Q26d
Q32
Q34
Q26g
Q29
Q23
Q15
Q47
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Quite different from the United States where age plays almost no role 
in explaining military attitudes, in Japan, older age cohorts seem to be more 
inclined to militarist attitudes. A more detailed analysis of the data set indicates, 
that some of that can be explained by the educational background of older age 
cohorts, which tends to be lower than those of younger age cohorts. This finding 
is contrary to the hypothesis assuming that because of their war or postwar 
experience older age cohort should be less inclined to favor military engagement. 
In reality, though, the SAGE data indicate the opposite. Therefore, additional 
factors have to be considered to explain why this is the case. 
One might also expect a negative correlation between education and 
militarism, in that those with a higher educational background are less inclined 
to militarism and more supportive of diplomatic and multilateral institutional 
approaches in dealing with actual or potential conflicts. Indeed, we can observe 
a weak correlation between educational level and support for militarist policies. 
Although the correlation in Japan is statistically significant with a Pearson 
correlation of r=.158** (US: r=.141**), this is mostly due to the fact that among 
those with the lowest educational background (up to junior high school) who 
make up a mere 12% of the sample in Japan, almost 20% were militarists, 
while the level for those with a post-graduate degree was a mere 5.3%. In both 
countries, educational levels are also correlated with age. Over 75% of those 
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with the lowest educational background are 60 years and older, equally divided 
into males and females.
A first look at some of the traditional social indicators such as gender, 
educational background, and income, reveals that none of them explains 
militarist sentiment very well, which is why they are not listed in the table 
above. Gender showed a rather weak correlation of r=-.099 in Japan (Combined: 
r=-.166). In Japan, 7% of women and 9.1% of men can be classified as 
militarists. 
3. Political Orientation 
On a scale between 0 (Left) and 10 (Right), in Japan, 19% of the respondents 
can be classified as left, 57% as center, and 22% as right(9). In the US, the 
corresponding percentage figures are: Left: 16%, Center: 56%,  Right: 27%. The 
distribution in terms of political party preference looks as follows:
In the US and in Japan, political orientation is a very strong predictor for 
militarist attitudes. Among those who consider themselves on the political right, 
the percentage of militarists is significantly higher than on the political left. 
Figure 2 illustrates political orientation is a very strong predictor in the United 
States where the correlation is almost linear with under 20% of those on the left 
(category 0-3) are militarists, but this share increases to over 90% for those on 
the right side of the political spectrum. Partisan influence is not quite as strong 
in Japan, however, we can observe a similar trend. Those on the political left and 
the political middle are overwhelmingly critical of militarist policies, but among 
126
9
144
26
30
215
21.7
1.5
24.8
4.5
5.2
37.0
Table 2: Political Party Preference in Japan (October 2004)
LDP
Komeito
DPJ
SDPJ
JCP
No party preference
%(10) N
© Vosse. Based on: SAGE 2004
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those on the political right up to 40% can be considered militarists. 
The trends for Japan are supported when we look at individual party 
affiliation. Among the 111 respondents with LDP party affiliation, almost 19% 
can be categorized as militarists, while about 10% of the 130 supporters of the 
DPJ belong to this category. As for the other political parties, Komeito, JCP, 
and SDP, the share of militarist was zero, which is in line with their official 
party policy. These figures of party affiliation and militarist attitude should 
be considered only as a general trend because of the small total N for Japan. 
Nevertheless, in the SAGE 2004 survey, over 60% or 304 respondents mentioned 
any one party affiliation. This is a relatively high percentage given that in most 
recent surveys, over 50% of Japanese could not name any preferred political 
party (GoJ Prime Ministers Office, 1967ff; NHK, 2004; ISSP, 2000(11)).
After having discovered that a political or party affiliation is a strong 
predictor of militarist attitudes in the US and in Japan, and that people on the 
right have a  significantly stronger militarist stance than those on the left, it is 
important to understand what type of right ideology is behind this. Affiliation 
with the right can mean different things in different countries, therefore, it is 
important to take a closer look at some of the other elements that might better 
explain whether the support is based on ideas of political conservatism, value 
conservatism, or a form of nationalism.  The SAGE 2004 survey provides some 
Figure 2
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answers to these questions. 
4. Support for Government and Leaders
In times of crisis or national emergencies societies often move together for a 
while and stand behind their leaders or governments. This phenomenon is often 
called “rally behind the flag” and we could observe this very strongly again after 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In these times, citizens become more supportive and 
less critical of their government response to the crisis and tolerate policies such 
as arrests without warrants or limitations to certain civil liberties. Although this 
might be understandable for a limited time period, on the longer run it severely 
limits the established democratic political process of checks and balances. Our 
survey included the question “In times of crisis, we should support our nation’s 
leaders even if we don’t agree with them”. In Japan, about half (49.6%) of the 
respondents agreed(12) with this statement. The support for this statement was 
even higher in the US, where about two-third (64.6%) of the respondents agreed 
with it. 
Figure 3
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Although at this point we do not have any comparable data from other 
countries, particularly countries in Western Europe, this seems to be a very 
high level of support and an indication for a potentially authoritarian attitude. 
Interestingly, we find a significantly higher percentage of militarists who 
agree with the statement, and therefore a first indication for a link between 
authoritarianism and militarist attitudes (Figure 3). A closer look at those 
with the highest levels of militarist attitudes in Japan(13) shows that the strong 
support(14) for leaders in times of crisis is held by an average of 92% of them, 
while among the three lowest levels of militarist attitudes (anti-militarists), a 
mere 25% shared this unconditional support for leaders.
These answers indicate the existence of a link between support for militarist 
policies and support for (although limited) authoritarian values. However, there 
is more evidence to support this view. When asked whether they would even be 
willing to give up some freedom to increase security, almost two-third (64%) of 
Japanese agreed, compared with almost three-fourth (72%) in the US. 
Table 3: 
Support for Leaders and Militarism in Japan
Strongly agree 
and Somewhat agree
1 Militarist 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 Strong Anti-Militarists
© Vosse. Based on Sage 2004.
Statement: We should agree with leaders even if we don’t agree with them.
100.0
88.9
88.2
70.3
54.9
43.8
25.0
5.7
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Again, there is a strong correlation between the willingness to give up some 
freedom for security in Japan and the United States(15).  While in Japan, only 8% 
were labeled as militarists for this study, among those who would give up some 
freedom the level is 20%, while only 5% among those who strongly disagree 
(Figure 4).
Both, strong support for leaders and the willingness to give up freedom or 
civil rights indicate a certain preference for limited authoritarianism. Militarists 
in Japan, as well as in the US, show a very strong tendency to support these 
Table 4: Give up freedom for security 
Japan USA
Strongly Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
9.9
54.4
21.4
14.3
31.1
41.5
15.4
12.0
© 2005, Wilhelm Vosse. Based on SAGE 2004. 
Question: In times of crisis citizens should be willing to give up some freedoms” 
so that our nations leaders can provide better security for our country.
Figure 4
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at least potentially authoritarian traits. There is another set of values that is 
also strongly correlated with militarist attitudes, namely a type of patriotism 
that stresses symbols such as the flag, rather than specific cultural, social, or 
economic achievements of the country. Yoshito Ishio(16) has called this kind of 
patriotism “naïve patriotism” because of its relatively unreflected and uncritical 
nature. One could certainly argue that all forms of patriotism are at some level 
based on symbols, however, when this becomes the predominant aspect of their 
patriotism, than this might indicate that this person will also support government 
policies simply because they seem to be based on the preservation of national 
pride and honor, and are less a rational means to achieve a certain outcome. 
An example of this attitude is a strong affiliation with the nation’s flag or other 
symbols. Patriotism can mean the defense of values that a country seems to 
stand for, such as democracy and freedom, but it can also mean support for 
its symbols. In the SAGE survey, respondents were asked whether they deem 
it important that schools should teach children to respect the flag. In the US, 
almost everyone (95%) support this view. In Japan, three-fourth (75%) support 
respect for the national flag. Hence a strong majority of people in both countries 
considers respect for the flag as important (Table 5).
Again, in both countries we find a strong correlation between respect for flag 
and militarism. As figure 5 illustrates, the share of militarists is significantly higher 
among those who demand respect for the national flag than among and those who 
do not. In Japan, this is particularly significant.  For those who strongly demand 
respect for national flag more than 30% can be labeled militarists. On the other 
hand, among those who disagree with this statement, a mere 4.7% are militarists. 
Table 5: Respect for the flag 
Japan USA
Strongly Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
29.2
45.3
17.2
8.3
74.7
19.2
4.4
1.8
© 2005, Wilhelm Vosse. Based on SAGE 2004. 
Statement: Schools should teach children to respect the national flag. 
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The relationship is similarly strong in the United States.
This is another indication of a specific type of right or conservative ideology 
of militarists in Japan (and to a similar degree also in the United States), namely 
a strong sense of authoritarianism and nationalism, which is combined with 
a preference for a stronger and more independent Japan. The latter point is 
supported by the fact that militarists in both countries agree in that they wish 
their countries to develop a stronger international profile(17).
Figure 5
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As figure 6 illustrates, the share of militarist is significantly higher than the 
average in Japan, and even more so in the United States. However, it is also 
remarkable, that among those who oppose a greater leadership role of Japan 
almost 10% can be label militarists. This might be an indication for a still widely 
held belief that the United States should provide this role for Japan, and are 
therefore critical of Japan taking up larger international responsibilities. It is also 
an indication of the divided debate about its future role in Japan itself. A debate 
between those who want to keep the status quo with US security guarantees in 
place, a gradual lifting of the limitation set in Article Nine of the Constitution, 
those who want to change Japan into a so-called “normal state”  or futsu no kuni, 
(Ozawa, 1994), to those who prefer to even go back to prewar strength with a 
strong military presence and nationalist ideology. A further analysis of the SAGE 
data will have to look into this fact.
Other attitudes shared by militarist in Japan is a combination of a 
comparatively strong trust in the military (r=.385**) and surprisingly also the 
Diet (r=.325**), some level of satisfaction with Japan’s foreign policy (r=.178**) 
and a negative attitude towards immigration (r=-.284**). That militarists in both 
Figure 6
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countries have a higher level of trust in the military than the average citizen 
might not be surprising, however, Japanese militarist are somewhat distinguished 
from Americans in that they have a relatively high confidence in their parliament 
and a strong trust in government(18) (r=.353**). In Japan, 41% of those who say 
they “just about always” trust the government are militarists, but only 3.6% of 
those who “hardly ever” trust the government are. The correlations in the US 
are very similar with respective figure of 76% and 32%. This can perhaps be 
explained by the different political systems, a presidential system in the US 
where citizens might often get the impression that Congress works against a 
president who seems to share many of the militarist traits, and a cabinet system 
in Japan, where the prime ministers constantly needs the support of the Diet. 
This interpretation for the United States is supported by the strong  satisfaction 
with the US foreign policy among militarists (r=.536**) and the strong trust in 
government (r=.306**).
IV. Conclusion
The SAGE 2004 survey highlighted some of the factors that influence 
militarist attitudes in Japan and the United States. We expected to find that 
Americans would lean significantly more towards militarist attitudes than 
Japanese, but the question was whether militarist attitudes are shaped and 
influenced by similar factors and whether this might indicate a change in 
militarist attitudes particularly in Japan.
Returning to the three hypothesis stated at the outset, we can conclude that (1) 
age influences militarist attitude in Japan, but not in the United States. However, 
contrary to the prediction that older age cohorts would be more critical of 
military policies, the opposite is true for Japan. When we follow the generational 
interpretation of changes in attitudes, we could assume that Japan might not 
become more militaristic in the near future, however, only longitudinal data can 
support this assumption. 
Secondly, we were assuming that militants would lean more towards 
the political right. This assumption proofed to be true. Indeed, in Japan (and 
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the US), there is a very strong correlation between ideology as well as party 
identification. This also means, that there is opposition in both countries against 
further militarization, and a change of government can also mean support for a 
different foreign policy platform. Although a significant share of LDP supporters 
are militarists, we also find militarists among supporters of the DPJ. This might 
be an indication for the weak foreign policy profile of the DPJ and the fact that it 
is still a kind of catch-all party with a weak ideological identity.
Since our first hypothesis proofed to be not true, the third hypothesis, 
namely the type of right wing or conservative ideology supported by militarists 
in Japan would be a form of modern conservatism that does in principle embrace 
a realist world view, exemplified by an acceptance of the legitimacy of the SDF 
and the need for cooperating with the United States, but modern in the sense that 
it would be critical of nationalistic or authoritarian views. However, this was 
neither the case in Japan nor in the United States. In Japan, militarist attitudes 
are accompanied by a somewhat uncritical stance towards authorities and a 
strong support for symbols of the state. This is the type of ideology that might 
be well represented by Tokyo’s Governor Ishihara Shintaro who is criticized 
but also supported for his ordinance to have the national anthem sung and the 
Japanese flag raised at school ceremonies. 
Overall, this analysis of the SAGE data set gives us a first idea about just 
one aspect of peace and security in Japan, namely the type of militarist sentiment 
among the Japanese general public, sixty years after the end of World War II. It 
is just a first indication about the current state of Japan’s foreign policy identity. 
It illustrates that the overall level of militarist attitudes is significantly lower than 
in the United States, but also that similar factors seem to have an influence on it. 
A further analysis of the survey data will give us a better more multifaceted view 
of foreign policy identities in contemporary Japan(19).
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Notes 
The analysis for this article is based on the Survey on Attitudes and Social Engagement 
(SAGE), a joint project of ICU and WSU. Principal investigators: Wilhelm Vosse (ICU) and 
Andrew Appleton (WSU). The SAGE survey was funded by the ICU Center of Excellence 
Program “Peace, Security, and Conviviality”.
A widely used metaphor for Japanese international role. See: McNaughter, 1994: 292; Hook 
et al., 2001.
On 28 November 2002, the Task Force on Foreign Relations issued the “Basic Strategies for 
Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy”.
Based on a NHK public opinion polls in January, February, and March 2004 (NHK Hoso 
bunka kenkyujo (ed.), 2004).
See among others: Hook and McCormack, 2001; Hook, 1996; Hook et al., 2001.
These following numbers (Q11 etc.) refer to the variable number in the SAGE 2004 data set.
In order to weight and balance different variable width and positive and negative direction of 
variables, the following formula has been used to calculate a military index that is used for the 
analysis here. Finally, three (3) is subtracted from the rounded figure to bring the index to a 
scale from 1-8, instead of 3-10, as it would be otherwise. 
The Japanese government has at times, and even today, considered military options, and 
the fact that AMPO as well as the US-Japan security guidelines include the possibility for 
Japanese troops to get involved in order to main regional security in areas around Japan. 
However, as the country comparison demonstrated, compared with the US, Japanese people 
are still very reluctant when it comes to considering military options.
This classification is based on the following categories: On the scale between 0 and 10: Left: 
0-3, Center: 4-6, Right: 7-10. This classification gives some preference to both the left and 
the right (both have a four point width, and the center a weight of 3 points). Nevertheless, the 
majority of respondents can be found in the center.
Percentage do not add up to 100 because the category “other parties” have been omitted and 
because of rounding.
In the ISSP 2000, 59% of the Japanese respondents could not name any party preference.
The figures represent the combined figures of those who answered “strongly agree” and 
“somewhat agree”. 
The three highest grades (1 to 3) on the scale between 1 (strong militarists) and 8 (strong anti-
militarists).
Those who answered: “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree”.
See table 1 for comparative bivariate correlations.
Categorization of respondents who have strong emotions for symbols of their nations, without 
necessarily reflecting on the actual position or achievements of their country, combined with 
a kind of “blind” support for those in power or the elite in general, suggested by Yoshito Ishio 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
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during the preparatory meeting for the SAGE 2004 survey project in June 2004.
Question in the SAGE 2004 survey: From your point of view, how desirable is it that Japan 
exerts strong leadership in world affairs? [Anata, nihon ga kokusaishakai ni oite tsuyoi 
shidouryoku wo hakki suru  koto ha, dono gurai nozomashii koto da to omoimasu ka?](In the 
US the question was directed towards a strong US leadership role).
Confidence in the Diet is similarly low in Japan. Only 28% trust the Japanese parliament 
“a great deal” or “somewhat”, while 71% have a rather negative impression of it. However, 
among those who expressed a strong or moderate level of trust towards the parliament in 
Japan, 23% and 11% are militarists, while only 3% of those who say they don’t trust their 
parliament at all are militarists.
For a very good overview of four different foreign policy schools among Japanese intellectuals 
and politicians, see: Klien, 2002.
(17)
(18)
(19)
References 
Berger, Thomas U. 1996. Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan. In Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.). The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics, U.S. 
Social Science Research Council, and on International Peace & Security Committee, New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Berger, Thomas U. 1998. Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. 
Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Carrière, Erin, Marc O'Reilly, and Richard Vengroff. 1999. In the Service of Peace: Reflexive 
Multilateralism and the Canadian Experience in Bosnia. Paper presented at the 40th 
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., February 16-20, 1999.
Foyle, Douglas C. 1999. Counting the Public in: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Foyle, Douglas C. 2003. Foreign Policy Analysis and Globalization. Public Opinion, World Opinon, 
and the Individual. International Studies Review 5 (2): 155-202.
Foyle, Douglas C. 2004. Leading the Public to War? The Influence of American Public Opinion on 
the Bush Administration's Decision to Go to War in Iraq. Int J Public Opin Res 16 (3): 269-94.
Holsti, Ole R. 1992. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond/Lippmann 
Consensus. International Studies Quarterly (36): 439-66.
Holsti, Ole R. 2004. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press.
Hook, Glenn D. 1996. Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan. London; New 
York: Routledge.
Hook, Glenn D, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson. 2001. Japan's 
328 329
Are Americans from Mars and 
Japanese from Venus?
International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security. London; New York: Routledge.
Hook, Glenn D, and Gavan McCormack. 2001. Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and 
Analysis. London; New York: Routledge.
ISSP (International Social Survey Program). 2000. Environment. Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitaet. Koeln: GESIS. Data set.
Kagan, Robert. 2002. Power and Weakness. Policy Review 113: 3-28.
Kagan, Robert. 2003. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New 
York: Alfred and Knopf.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Klien, Susanne. 2002. Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: an Intercultural 
Perspective. London; New York: Routledge.
Kull, Steven, and Clay Ramsay. 2000. Elite Misperceptions of U.S. Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy. In Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (eds.). Decisionmaking 
in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy 
in the 21st Century, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis. 2003. Misperceptions and the Iraq War. Political 
Science Quarterly 118 (4): 569-99.
Lawrence, Jacobs R. and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy? American 
Political Science Review 99 (1): 107-23.
McNaughter, Thomas L. 1994. U.S. Military Forces in East Asia: The Case for Long-Term 
Engagement. In Gerald L. Curtis (ed.). The United States, Japan, and Asia. New York: W.W. 
Norton.
Mueller, John E. 1994. Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mueller, John E. 2000. Public Opinion as a Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy: Assessing the 
Perceived Value of American and Foreign Lives. Los Angeles, CA.
Nacos, Brigitte L., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. 2000. Decisionmaking in a Glass 
House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st 
Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Nakanishi, Hiroshi. 2004. Furukute atarashii jirenma. Minshu seiji to gaikou [The Old But New 
Dilemma. Democratic Politics and Foreign Relations]. Gaiko foramu [Gaiko forum] 196 (11): 
20-25.
NHK bunka kenkyujo. 2004. Iraku jieitai haken to kokumin ishiki [Dispatch of the Self Defense 
Forces to Iraq and National Consciousness]. In NHK bunken seron chousa fairu. At website: 
http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/ippan/ippan04040101.pdf (accessed: 30 October 2005).
Nishitani, Makiko. 2001. Kokusai yoron to kokunai yoron no renkan. Beikoku no wangankikisensou 
ni taisuru gaikouseisaku no jirei toshite (Hikakuseiji to Kokusaiseiji No Aida) [The Relations 
Between International Public Opinion and Domestic Public Opinion. The Case Study of the US 
Foreign Policy During the Gulf War Crisis (Between Comparative Politics and International 
328 329
Are Americans from Mars and 
Japanese from Venus?
Politics)]. Kokusai seiji [International Politics] 128: 115-29.
Ozawa, Ichiro. 1994. Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation. Tokyo; New York: 
Kodansha.
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in 
Americans' Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Powlick, Philip, J., and Andrew Z. Latz. 1998. Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy 
Nexus. Mershon International Studies Review 42: 29-61.
Prime Ministers Office. 1969-. Shakai ishiki ni kansuru seron chousa, [Public Opinion Poll 
Concerning Social Consciousness]. Yearly public opinion survey. Tokyo.
Prime Ministers Office. 1958-. Kokumin seikatsu ni kansuru seron chousa, [Public Opinion Poll 
Concerning Citizen and State]. Yearly public opinion survey. Tokyo.
Sobel, Richard, and Eric Shiraev. 2003. International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis. Lanham, 
Md.: Lexington Books.
Sobel, Richard. 1993. Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy: the Controversy Over Contra Aid. 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
Sobel, Richard. 2001. The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: 
Constraining the Colossus. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States (ed.). 
2002. Worldviews 2002. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Data 
set.
Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1990. Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Yamaguchi, Jirou. 2003. Seiji jibyou: Seron ga machigatte iru to kangaeru "Heiwa Boke" Koizumi 
shushou no taibeitsuizui to iu jubaku [Political Comments on Current Events: Prime Ministers 
Koizumi's Spell to Follow the U.S.'s 'Peace-At-Any-Prize Mind Set' and to Think That Public 
Opinion is Wrong]. Shukan kinyoubi [Friday Weekly] 20.
330
日本人は、好んで自国を平和主義国家、問題解決のために軍事的選択肢をとること
を好まない国家であると描き出す。第 9条において戦争放棄が謳われている日本国憲
法は「平和憲法」として広く受け容れられており、「非核三原則」は他国にとっての
模範であると見做されている。軍国主義と領土拡張主義の終焉から半世紀を経た今、
日本人は過去から学び、「富国強兵」のスローガンは、少なくとも名目上は軍隊を持
たない貿易立国へと転換されたように見える。他方、日本は第二次世界大戦に敗北し
たのち、他の選択肢をとることが出来ず、外交・安全保障政策上の選択肢が制限され
ているという状況は今日に至るまで続いているという解釈が存在する。本論は、今日
の日本人は本当に軍事的選択肢をとることを好まないのか、そしていかなる要素が日
本人及びアメリカ人の軍事的手段を促しているのだろうか、という 2つの問題を扱う。
本論における分析は、2004年の終わりに行われた「国際社会との関わり方につい
ての日米比較調査」及び日本と米国で行われた郵送調査の結果に基づいている。最初
に行われた予備的分析は、日本人は実際のところアメリカ人と比べて軍事的手段に対
する傾斜が弱いことを明らかにした。しかし、同時に、極めて類似した要素が両国民
に軍事力への傾斜を促していることが明らかになった。政治的イデオロギー、権威主
義的傾向、愛国主義、軍を含む政治制度に対する強い信頼、そしてリーダーシップの
強化に対する支持が軍事的手段に対する傾斜の重要な前提条件として挙げられる。
結論として、全体として軍事的な含意のある政策に対する支持は今日の日本におい
て比較的弱いと言えるが、他方において、現状における強い愛国主義的、権威主義的
傾向と将来におけるその強化の可能性は、日本の軍事的役割の強化が国民から支持さ
れうるということを示唆している。
アメリカ人は火星から、日本人は金星から来た？
̶日米両国国民の自国外交政策に対する
態度の相違の説明のための新たなアプローチ̶
＜　要　約　＞
ヴィルヘルム・フォッセ
